Tuesday 11 March 2008
Sunday 2 March 2008
The Danish Cartoons and the Freedom of Expression
Danish newspapers decided to exercise their ‘freedom of expression’ and republish the cartoons that Muslims all over the world found offensive and insulting.The cartoons were printed for the second time in response to an alleged discovery by the Danish intelligence of a conspiracy by three Muslims in Denmark to assassinate one of the cartoonists. To paint a fair picture it must be noted that none of the conspirators of the murder plot are being put on trial with two of them who are non-citizens being extradited and the third, a Danish Muslim being set free without trial.
On the first occassion German, French, Swiss and other European newspapers (excluding British newspapers) republished the cartoons to stand by the Danish newspapers. The cartoons opened a Pandora’s Box of issues and prompts a serious examination of how far the freedom of expression goes.
Democratic societies cherish the freedom of expression because there cannot be a truly functioning democracy if people are not allowed to express their opinion and participate in it fully. Nevertheless it is not an absolute right. It is constrained and as stated above the cartoons question where the boundary lines are drawn. If the purpose of the freedom of expression is to ensure a well lubricated democratic mechanism, then the freedom of expression should extend that far.
Therefore the question boils down to whether these cartoons in any way help the ‘democratic’ framework of any society? If they do, then Muslims should learn to respect the rights of the European cartoonists. To answer this we need to imagine a situation where ridicule of the sacred was commonplace and Danish cartoons were standard modes of political and social expression.
This imaginative task is made easy in that a somewhat similar although not identical event did occur at the University of Oregon where one student newspaper, the Commentator published the Danish cartoons and in response another student newspaper the Insurgent published cartoons showing Jesus Christ in a disparaging manner.
The Insurgent was not published by a group of Muslim students but by American students who justified the publication on the basis that they wanted Americans to realise the offense in the Danish cartoons. They thought that the best way to do this would be to translate the offense into Christian terms. The question then is did it ignite a sense of empathy amongst Christians for Muslims? The answer is obviously that it did not.
With the aid of that reflection we can now return to assess the value of these cartoons to a democratic society. Subjecting another community to ridicule and disrespect and that too deliberately does not help but only harms the democratic process. If one views democracy as a continuing dialogue between groups in a society it is important that the channels of communication are kept unhindered and more so intact. Therefore whilst a democratic society is nourished by free expression of views and thoughts democratic societies also require a restriction of those rights where they endanger the democratic process. In the context of Europe, Article 10(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights recognises that since the freedom of expression “carries with it duties and responsibilities, [it] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights carries a similar restriction on grounds of protecting the rights of others and public morals.
The jurist Ronald Dworkin writing in The Guardian on February 14, 2006 joined the cartoon debate and wrote that even bigots should be allowed to express themselves “If we expect bigots to accept the verdict of the majority once the majority has spoken, then we must permit them to express their bigotry in the process whose verdict we ask them to respect”. However how much does such bigotry help the bigot or his cause let alone the process?
To put my argument in a nutshell, a dissenter in a family discussion on a choice for a holiday decides to ridicule the other family members in the most offensive manner. It makes the other members angry and offended. They feel ridiculed and disrespected. Can he, the dissenter, justify the ridicule by saying that the ridicule was in exercise of his right to participate? The answer is dependent on the purpose of his participation. He is allowed to participate and permitted to express himself so that he contributes to the decision-making process. However if his contribution is patently and deliberately negative, aimed at disrupting the process and the proceedings, they cannot be a legitimate exercise of his right to participate in the discussion. It is in fact an abuse of those rights. The entire question is how does it help the decision making process or the dissenter’s cause itself?
The freedom of expression has its democratic purpose. Its limits are pegged to that. Where it strays outside its democratic purpose, it is not a legitimate exercise of the freedom but an abuse of it.
On the first occassion German, French, Swiss and other European newspapers (excluding British newspapers) republished the cartoons to stand by the Danish newspapers. The cartoons opened a Pandora’s Box of issues and prompts a serious examination of how far the freedom of expression goes.
Democratic societies cherish the freedom of expression because there cannot be a truly functioning democracy if people are not allowed to express their opinion and participate in it fully. Nevertheless it is not an absolute right. It is constrained and as stated above the cartoons question where the boundary lines are drawn. If the purpose of the freedom of expression is to ensure a well lubricated democratic mechanism, then the freedom of expression should extend that far.
Therefore the question boils down to whether these cartoons in any way help the ‘democratic’ framework of any society? If they do, then Muslims should learn to respect the rights of the European cartoonists. To answer this we need to imagine a situation where ridicule of the sacred was commonplace and Danish cartoons were standard modes of political and social expression.
This imaginative task is made easy in that a somewhat similar although not identical event did occur at the University of Oregon where one student newspaper, the Commentator published the Danish cartoons and in response another student newspaper the Insurgent published cartoons showing Jesus Christ in a disparaging manner.
The Insurgent was not published by a group of Muslim students but by American students who justified the publication on the basis that they wanted Americans to realise the offense in the Danish cartoons. They thought that the best way to do this would be to translate the offense into Christian terms. The question then is did it ignite a sense of empathy amongst Christians for Muslims? The answer is obviously that it did not.
With the aid of that reflection we can now return to assess the value of these cartoons to a democratic society. Subjecting another community to ridicule and disrespect and that too deliberately does not help but only harms the democratic process. If one views democracy as a continuing dialogue between groups in a society it is important that the channels of communication are kept unhindered and more so intact. Therefore whilst a democratic society is nourished by free expression of views and thoughts democratic societies also require a restriction of those rights where they endanger the democratic process. In the context of Europe, Article 10(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights recognises that since the freedom of expression “carries with it duties and responsibilities, [it] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights carries a similar restriction on grounds of protecting the rights of others and public morals.
The jurist Ronald Dworkin writing in The Guardian on February 14, 2006 joined the cartoon debate and wrote that even bigots should be allowed to express themselves “If we expect bigots to accept the verdict of the majority once the majority has spoken, then we must permit them to express their bigotry in the process whose verdict we ask them to respect”. However how much does such bigotry help the bigot or his cause let alone the process?
To put my argument in a nutshell, a dissenter in a family discussion on a choice for a holiday decides to ridicule the other family members in the most offensive manner. It makes the other members angry and offended. They feel ridiculed and disrespected. Can he, the dissenter, justify the ridicule by saying that the ridicule was in exercise of his right to participate? The answer is dependent on the purpose of his participation. He is allowed to participate and permitted to express himself so that he contributes to the decision-making process. However if his contribution is patently and deliberately negative, aimed at disrupting the process and the proceedings, they cannot be a legitimate exercise of his right to participate in the discussion. It is in fact an abuse of those rights. The entire question is how does it help the decision making process or the dissenter’s cause itself?
The freedom of expression has its democratic purpose. Its limits are pegged to that. Where it strays outside its democratic purpose, it is not a legitimate exercise of the freedom but an abuse of it.
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